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Abstract: 
 
We suspect that the efficiency of intergovernmental grants is related to the level of fiscal autonomy of 
the subsidized government. In this paper we construct and estimate a panel data model capturing the 
role of fiscal federalism on the effectiveness of EU Structural Actions in enhancing public expenditure 
in selected policy areas. We use data from the seventeen Spanish regions for the period 1993-2007. 
Results unambiguously support the hypothesis that the effectiveness of the ERDF decreases with larger 
fiscal autonomy. The role of the European Social Fund is still under analysis. These results could 
reflect the fact that fiscal decentralization in Spain has been focused to larger taxation autonomy 
without affecting regional income redistribution.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Cohesion Policy designed by the European Union has been contributing actively to the 
achievement of sustainable economic growth in European regions over the last decades. The recent 
political and economic developments in the EU may justify the revision of some of the principles 
driving the Cohesion Policy so as it can perform its duty with equal success in the coming years. One 
of the main challenges to tackle, which is already taking place, is the transition of the Cohesion Policy 
to the new European Union after the more recent enlargements of the Union, which have leaded to a 
larger and, in particular, more heterogeneous, field of application of the policy. The recent economic 
crisis, will, in addition, put more pressure on the consolidation of the public budget in all levels of the 
public administration.  
 
One of the aspects that must be put into consideration, and the issue covered in this paper, is the role 
that the different levels of fiscal decentralization achieved in every Member State have on the 
mechanisms ruling the Cohesion Policy. In particular, we will study the programs design under the 
Structural Actions
1
 that pursue the increase of public investment on key areas for growth. We will, 
therefore, focus our attention in these policies whose purpose is enhancing Public Investment, and will 
try to evaluate whether the level of fiscal decentralization of the member states play a role in their 
effectiveness. 
 
Both issues, Fiscal decentralization and EU intergovernmental grants, have been addressed separately 
in numerous empirical studies. In most of the cases the focus of the studies has been centered in 
estimating the effect of these policies on economic growth. Only very recently, some researchers have 
                                                          
1
 In the nomenclature of the European Union, the term “Structural Funds” usually refer to the four Funds 
conforming the so-called Regional Policy (European Regional Development Fund, or ERDF; European Social 
Fund, or ESF; Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance, or FIFG; and the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund, or EAGGF which has been replaced by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund in 2007) 
while the “Structural Actions” include, in addition, the Cohesion Fund. In this paper, we will use both terms 
indistinctively. 
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put their attention on the impact on the distribution of public expenditures. But, to our knowledge, 
there is no previous work trying to address the importance of the simultaneous effect of both policies.  
  
Economic theory has also traditionally modeled the issues of fiscal decentralization and effectiveness 
of intergovernmental grants separately. Nevertheless, very recent developments of economic theory in 
the field of intergovernmental grants have identified the role of fiscal autonomy of granted government 
in the efficiency of the grants. Results, if not totally contradictory, are not coincident among the few 
studies.  
 
Volden (2007), for example, finds that the effect of grants depends on the capacity of the recipient 
government to efficiently raise taxes. Governments with greater tax-efficiency
2
 would experience 
higher crowding-out induced by the grant, meaning that the grant becomes less effective in enhancing 
public expenditure in a particular policy area
3
. Kappeller (2007) finds, instead, that the granted 
governments would under-invest when tax-autonomy is restricted, particularly in rich regions. In this 
case, the level of matching-grants is also suboptimal.  
 
Economic theory probably needs of further empirical studies identifying stylized facts over which 
build assumptions and develop richer models. But also the public administrations and the society in 
general, need of better instruments to judge the results of the several policies taken over. Based on the 
declared target that the Structural Actions –exclusive of the ESF- are intended to promote Public 
Investment in key areas for growth, this paper tries to show that the effectiveness of these policies will 
depend on the level of fiscal decentralization of the country or region of application. Being this the 
case, the policy implication yield by this result would include taking into account the different levels of 
fiscal federalism achieved in the Member States in the rules governing the Structural Actions. The one-
size-fits-all strategy, that has given reasonably good results in the past, may be improved in order to 
                                                          
2
 Defining tax-efficiency as the capacity that the subsidized government has to efficiently raise taxes. One could 
think that this variable may be closely linked to the level of fiscal autonomy.  
3
 Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda (2005) link the causality in the other direction, stating that economies with a 
higher “flypaper effect” (expenditure response to an intergovernmental grant) would have a lower optimal level 
of tax-decentralization.  
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serve a larger and more heterogeneous European Union in a new scenario in which, most likely, taught 
constrains in the public budget are going to remain for years after the crisis is overcome. 
 
Spanish regions are, probably, the better example of the development on both policies over the past 
few years. Spain have, simultaneously, experienced an important decentralization process as well as 
benefited greatly of the Cohesion Policies run through the Structural Actions. Both processes have 
been asymmetric and independent: asymmetric because while fiscal federalism has affected differently 
in time and degree the several Spanish regions, the allocation of Structural Action shows also 
important differences across regions; and independent, because both policies are completely unrelated, 
since there is no economical, social or geographical aspects running the processes of decentralization. 
Therefore, the stronger effect of the Structural Actions devoted to poorer regions affect, equally, to 
regions with high or low level of fiscal autonomy. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the main facts and figures describing 
fiscal decentralization and Structural Funds in Spain; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework that 
will help to interpret the results; Section 4 presents the data and variables; Section 5 describes the 
methodology and the results; and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND REGIONAL POLICY IN SPAIN 
 
In this section, we introduce some figures that show how Spanish regions are a suitable illustration of 
the two policies under consideration (fiscal decentralization and EU cohesion policy), as they affect 
these regions with a relatively large degree of cross-sectional variability.  
 
The recent process of decentralization of public financing in Spain starts with the Spanish Constitution 
of 1978. The Constitution set the bases for the ulterior establishment of the seventeen regional bodies, 
defined as “Autonomous Communities”, which are the main beneficiaries of the decentralization 
process. The Constitution states that the level of competencies assumed by each regional government 
6 
 
and the pace at which these competencies are assumed is not homogeneous among all regions. The 
constitution of the regional governments finished in 1983
4
.  
 
Figure [1] about here 
 
Simultaneously to the process of political adaptation to the new Constitution, occurred the most 
important increase of public spending. Total public spending moved from representing less than thirty 
percent of GDP in the late seventies to lay around fifty percent in the last years. Figure [1] shows how 
the main beneficiary of the decentralization in the last years has been the regional sector. Local public 
expenditure has only increased its share over total expenditure two percentage points in thirteen years, 
while the regional level has increased to over 30% of total public expenditure in 2008, compared to 
1995 when it represented around 17 %. Figure [2] shows that the process of decentralization that Spain 
has experienced is not a general pattern of behavior of the countries on its economic environment.  
 
Figure [2] about here 
 
The Spanish Constitution discriminates between two types of regions: the so-called "historic 
nationalities" or regions with a high level of competencies
5
 and the ten remaining regions
6
 (and the two 
autonomous cities) that in principle assume a lower level of competencies. In practice, the regions with 
high levels of competencies experienced a higher level of fiscal autonomy in the beginning, but the gap 
between both types of regions have been reduced as long as the decentralization process has been 
taking place. We can observe this phenomenon if we build a ratio of fiscal decentralization as the 
coefficient between per capita expenditure at the regional level to the per capita expenditure at the 
central level, which is shown in Figure [3]: 
 
                                                          
4
 Although later, in 1995, were constituted the Statutes of the two Autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla. These 
have been excluded from our analysis due to data availability.  
5
 Andalusia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and Comunidad Valenciana.  
6
Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile La-Mancha, Castile and Leon, Comunidad de Madrid, 
Extremadura, Murcia and La Rioja.  
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Figure [3] about here 
  
A deeper analysis of the functional categories
7
 reveals that the category "Social Public Goods" -using 
the nomenclature of the functional classification used by the Spanish "Ministerio de Economía y 
Hacienda"- is the main area of decentralization for the regions with a low level of competencies as well 
as the main component of the public budget. Other functional categories that have experienced a 
significant level of decentralization have been "Social Security and Promotion", "Economic regulation 
of Productive Sectors", "General Public Services" and "Economic Public Goods" 
 
While the level of fiscal autonomy is almost identical among the regions with low level of 
competencies, fiscal competencies among the regions with high level of competencies is more 
heterogeneous
8
. This is also reflected in the distribution of the revenue-side of the budget shown in 
Figure 4. In particular, two of the regions (Basque Country and Navarre) have particular privileges 
about the collection of taxes in their territory. Spanish regional financing scheme has gone through 
several revisions over time (See Lopez-Laborda, 2006; De la Fuente, 2010). For the time window 
analyzed in this paper, there have been three different systems into force (1991-1996; 1997-2001; and 
2002-2008). These revisions have established, subsequently, a larger share of tax revenues in the 
budget of regional governments as well as larger leeway to decide on the level of taxation, and 
normative capacity to establish of abolish certain taxes. The redistributive mechanism, however, has 
not been modified until the revision implemented on 2009 (See Bassols et al., 2010) which is outside 
the period under consideration in this paper. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Both groups of regions are not representing either geographical concentration or economic 
characteristics, meaning that there is no other common denominator between regions with high level of 
                                                          
7
 See González-Alegre (2010) 
8
 See Molero (2001) 
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autonomy or between regions with low level of autonomy other than their political status. In both 
groups of regions there are objective 1 regions (which are eligible for most of the Structural Funds) 
and regions with per capita income larger than the national and European averages. Figure [5] has the 
purpose of showing that there is no systematic difference in the amount of Structural Funds from the 
EU that both groups of regions receive.  
Figure [5] about here 
 
The increase in the size regional governments has also affected the distribution of public regional 
spending among the different economic categories. The regions have augmented the share of current 
spending, devoting a minor part of their funds to increasing their stock of capital (Figure [6]). One 
might think that this situation could be induced by a certain reallocation of competencies between the 
central and regional governments. However, the Central Government has not increased its share of 
capital expenditure, but has, on the contrary, slightly decreased it. The fall in the capital share of public 
expenditure is clearly more relevant in the regions with low levels of competencies, which are also 
those that have undergone a more profound process of decentralization.  
 
Figure [6] about here 
        
 
 
3. MODELLING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 
This section shows how theoretical predictions about the impact of intergovernmental grants on public 
administrations gaining fiscal autonomy within a federation, depend largely on the assumptions used to 
model fiscal autonomy. As mentioned before, the existence of theoretical models that combine fiscal 
decentralization and intergovernmental grants is relatively limited.  
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Nevertheless, the literature about the conditions that make fiscal decentralization desirable is extremely 
prolific
9
. Arguments in favour of fiscal decentralization rely largely on preference heterogeneity for 
public goods provision among regions (Besley and Coate, 2003; Brueckner, 2005; Rubinchick-
Pessach, 2005) and its impact on multifactor productivity (Martínez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006) while 
arguments against are usually based on internalization of spillover effects among regions (Chu and 
Yang, 2012) , strategic behaviour towards redistribution (Oates, 2005) or fiscal competition (Leite-
Monteiro and Sato, 2003; Hatfiel and Padro, 2008).  
 
For the sake of this paper, however, it is important to distinguish between fiscal autonomy based on the 
capacity to decide on the distribution of the public budget –both in the expenditures and the revenues 
side of the budget- and fiscal autonomy affecting the mechanisms of regional redistribution of income. 
Based on one of the sub-games
10
 included in Volden (2007), let us assume a sub-national government 
which acts as a representative agent of its constituents and that benefits from providing an investment 
good and keeping taxes low, so that: 
 
Us = (yi)fc,s – (ts + tn) f b,s - d - xs 
 
The utility of the sub-national government depends positively on income, which is related to the public 
investment good according to the production function yi=iqi. The function fc,s represents the fraction 
of credit that the sub-national government obtains from the provision of the public investment good; ts 
and tn represent taxes issued by the sub-national and national governments respectively, and fb,s 
represents the fraction of blame that the sub-national government obtains from taxation. Finally, the 
last term captures the disutility associated from taking a policy direction which deviates, in a one 
dimensional line, from the optimal direction preferred by the representative agents.  
 
                                                          
9
 Being Oates (1972) considered as the blast-off that stimulated most subsequent research. An intuitive review of 
the evolution of the literature may be found in Weingast (2009)   
10
 Introducing two main innovations to the model: the consideration of a public investment good instead of a 
consumption good an the introduction of a redistributive mechanism among sub-national governments.  
10 
 
Taxation is determined in order to balance the budget, taking into account the presence of an 
intergovernmental transfer (G) and a redistribution policy represented by the parameter b, so that: 
 
ts = [ms yi – G - b(Y – yi)] / s;     
 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the national government does not provide any amount of the 
public investment good (yi = ys). The national government also equilibrates its budget, so that ts= G / 
n. 
 
The term ms captures the cost for the sub-national government of providing the investment good while 
s (n)  [0,1] captures the efficiency at which the sub-national (national) government is able to raise 
taxes. The marginal cost and tax efficiency parameters represent, respectively, the level of fiscal 
autonomy on the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget of the sub-national government. 
Implicitly, ms decreases as the sub-national government gets larger autonomy to decide on the policy 
areas and functional themes of the expenditure projects. In parallel, s captures limitations in the tax 
capacity of the government and increases as government gains leeway to decide on the distribution and 
range of its own taxation scheme.  
 
 Finally, there is a third dimension of fiscal decentralization represented by the redistribution parameter 
b  [0,1], since there is a zero-sum redistribution mechanism among regions whose income deviate 
from average income Y. For b=1, regional income is identical among all regions due to redistribution 
while for b=0 there is no redistribution at all.  
 
The optimal choice of public investment good provision solves the maximization problem of the utility 
function of the sub-national government subject to its budget constraint. Assuming that the functions 
fc,s and f b,s, take the form, respectively, (msys – G / ms ys) and (tn / ts+tn), we obtain:  
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Ys = [G + bY + /2([ss/(ms+bs)]-G/n)] / [ ms+bs] 
 
The amount of public investment provided because of the implementation of the intergovernmental 
grant, (ys,grant – ys,nogrant) is, therefore: 
 
[G – (s G)/2n)] / [ms+bs] 
 
This relation summarizes the main implications about the relationship between fiscal autonomy and 
intergovernmental grants in the model: 
 
Proposition: The effectiveness of a public grant to investment in enhancing public investment depends 
on the level of fiscal autonomy of the subsidized government. In particular, greater fiscal autonomy in 
the expenditure side of the budget or in redistribution policies increase the effectiveness of the grant 
while greater taxation autonomy leads to lower effectiveness of the grants.  
 
We show that the effectiveness of intergovernmental transfers is affected by fiscal decentralization. As 
long as larger fiscal autonomy is based on reducing the importance of redistributive mechanisms 
among regions or on enlarging the expenditure capacities of subsidized governments, decentralization 
will make intergovernmental grants more effective. However, when fiscal decentralization in based on 
a larger autonomy on the taxation capacities of subsidized government, which seems to be the case of 
the Spanish regions, the effectiveness of intergovernmental transfers is negatively related to 
decentralization.     
    
4. SOURCES OF DATA 
 
The model is estimated for a balanced panel of the seventeen Spanish regions over the period 1993-
2007. The sample begins in 1993 because of the lack of data on EU transfers from previous years.  
Nevertheless, the first allocation of the Structural Actions under their current format takes place in 
12 
 
1989. We use data until 2007 due to data availability. The main data-source for our variables of 
interest, disaggregated public expenditure for the Spanish regions, is the database "Liquidación de 
Presupuestos de las Comunidades Autonomas" published by the Ministry of Economy of Spain. Some 
of these data are also available online in the BADESPE database, elaborated by the "Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales". 
     
Dependent variable 
     
The dependent variable is public investment, expressed as a share of GDP, of the Spanish regional 
governments. The data for Public Investment –defined as public capital expenditure, which includes 
real investment as well as capital transfers- have been extracted from the database “Liquidación de los 
Presupuestos de las Comunidades Autónomas” published by the Ministry of Economics. The series for 
GDP have been extracted from the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
     
Explanatory variables 
 
The independent variable in which we focus most of our attention is the capital transfers from the 
European Union to the Spanish regional governments, and we call it “eusf”. It includes the accrual 
revenues of the regional governments corresponding to transfers from the European Union budget to 
the capital account, under the concept of any of the Structural Funds or the Cohesion Fund. Most of 
these transfers will correspond to the three Structural Funds devoted to promote Investment (ERDF, 
EAGGF and FIFG) or to the Cohesion Fund.  
 
In some of our estimations we include also a measure of Fiscal Decentralization, that we denote “dec”. 
We recall here the controversy described in Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) about the 
construction of a variable representing fiscal autonomy. In principle, such a variable should be able to 
quantify the activities of sub-national governments resulting from their independent decisions. Very 
often, there are some expenditures are carried out by some levels of the public administration while the 
13 
 
effective control of these policy remain on a higher level of the public administration. In practice, the 
available data do not let us to address properly these issues. The literature has adopted the standard 
measure
11
 of fiscal decentralization described by Oates (1972) based on local or sub-national to total 
public expenditure ratio. We have discarded the use of a decentralization measure based on the revenue 
side of the budget as made by other authors
12
. The main reason is that in our set of regions the 
expenditure side of the budget accommodates better the implementation of new competencies in 
regional governments
13
. The level of decentralization is built as the ratio of per capita regional 
expenditure to per capita central government expenditure. The ratio has been constructed using data on 
regional public expenditure extracted from the database "Presupuestos de las Comunidades 
Autonomas"; the data on public expenditure by the central government has been extracted from 
BADESPE; the series of population are from EUROSTAT. 
         
 [Table 1 . Variable description and sources of data] 
       
The selection of the remaining control variables has been largely based on studies focused on the 
determinants of public capital spending, keeping in mind that most of these studies use country data 
and some of the variables that they include would not fit in our regional panel data (budget deficit or 
industrialized country dummy, for example). The set of control variables includes Public 
Consumption
14
, Private Investment population growth, GDP growth, and regionalized central 
government capital expenditure.  
 
The motivation to include an indicator of the expenditure capacity of the government –Public 
Consumption- can be found, among others, in Kneller et al. (1999), who suggest that we should also 
include a variable to account for the public spending not devoted to investment. Private Investment is a 
key determinant of Public Investment according to De Haan et al. (1996) and Sturm (2001). Changes 
                                                          
11
 Zang and Zou, 1998; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2005; Iimi, 2005; Jin et al., 2005 
12
 De Haan et al., 1996;  Diaz-Cayero et al., 2003 
13
 See González-Alegre (2008) 
14
 Defined as public current expenditures. 
14 
 
in population could be a determinant of the necessities of public capital relative to publicly provided 
consumption goods, in fact, Population has been included as an approximation of labour force supply 
in many studies that examine the productivity of public capital (Ramirez, 1998; Everaert and Heylen, 
2001). 
 
 The rate of production growth is traditionally included as a determinant of public expenditure
15
 since 
it has been argued that the income elasticity of the demand of some public goods could affect the 
allocation of public expenditure as growth rates fluctuate. Central government capital expenditure tries 
to control for the policy of the central government regarding public capital, and the substitution effect 
that could induce to regions. We have retrieved these series, with regional level of breakdown, from 
two data-sources: IVIE database (until 2000) and the General Budget (“Presupuestos Generales del 
Estado”) from 2001 onwards. We were able to check the consistency among both series, since we had 
data from the General Budget prior to 2000. 
     
Restrictive fiscal policy measures may also be induced by high levels of budget deficits or government 
debt. In our case, however, since we work with regional-level data and the leeway of Spanish regional 
governments to incur into deficit in the period under consideration was extremely limited, we have 
decided to omit a variable capturing public deficit at the regional level. We will include this variable 
only in the equivalent estimation using country-level data, whose results are shown in table [7].  
 
There have been several studies trying to link political variables to the tendency to alter patterns of 
public spending. However, studies focused on public investment have not been able to find any 
significant link of the current level of public investment with political variables. We recall here the 
results in Sturm (2001), for non OECD countries, De Haan et al. (1996), for OECD countries, and 
Mizutani and Tanaka (2005), who use regional data from Japan prefectures. Therefore, we do not 
include any political variable among our set of controls. 
  
                                                          
15
See for example Miller and Russek (1997), Kneller et al. (1999) Bose et al. (2007). 
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 [Table 2: Summary Statistics] 
     
5. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
 
In this section we construct and estimate a panel data model evaluating the efficiency of the European 
Regional policy by estimating the response of public investment towards the grants that tend to 
promote it. To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies trying to link the Structural Actions, or 
more generally the effectiveness of intergovernmental grants, with the level of fiscal autonomy of the 
granted administration. Both issues have been analyzed separately, and usually focusing the attention 
to their relation with economic growth. Therefore, none of the studies presented in table A1 will be 
comparable to the research we undertake in this paper, but they have a common denominator with one 
of the main issues introduced here: they analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization or the Regional 
Policy of the EU using data from the Spanish economy.  
 
 
In order to assess the importance of fiscal decentralization in these mechanisms, we try different 
methodological strategies. First of all, we will split the sample in two sub-sample groups with different 
levels of fiscal autonomy. We will use two alternative criteria for splitting the sample: one according to 
the level of fiscal autonomy recognized in the Spanish Constitution and the second one depending on 
the time-dimension of the panel, taking advantage of the evolution of fiscal decentralization across 
time; Secondly, we will introduce the variable “fiscal decentralization” in our panel, and an interaction 
term relating this variable with the structural actions transfers that will capture the joint effect of both 
variables; Finally, we consider the possibility of estimating a system of equations that determines, 
simultaneously, the two variables in which we focus our interest: Public Investment and EUSF. 
 
Sample-Breaking 
 
16 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that public investment may be affected by European Structural Funds ' 
grants, we have constructed a model in which the dependent variable is Public Investment at the 
regional level for the seventeen Spanish regional bodies. The set of explanatory variables includes our 
main variable of interest, EUSF, represent the capital transfers from the EU to the regional government 
allocated to the region "i" in the current year "t". We have also introduced in the model other control 
variables: private investment, public consumption, GDP growth, population growth, and central 
government investment, included in the vector x: 
 
i,t i,t i,t ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x   + i i t      (1) 
 
Where   is the coefficient that describes the impact of Structural Funds on Public Investment and the 
main target of our estimation;  x  is a vector, (1x5), of explanatory variables and    is the set of 
parameters, (5x1) associated to these control variables that must be estimated; i  is the unobservable 
unit-specific effect and ,i t is the unobservable error term. 
 
In order to estimate equation (1), we have split the sample attending to the level of fiscal autonomy of 
the regions. We have taken two alternative criteria into consideration in order to consider sub-samples: 
firstly, we have classified Spanish regions into two subgroups according to the level of fiscal autonomy 
that the Spanish Constitution recognizes them. Therefore, we create a group of what the Spanish 
Constitution considers
16
 “Historic Nationalities”, and a second group of the remaining ten regions17, 
for which the Constitutions recognized a lower level of Autonomy. 
  
And secondly, as a robustness check, we have also considered the time-dimension of the series in order 
to identify two alternative subgroups with remarkable differences in their level of fiscal autonomy. We 
have selected the year 2000 as the break point, which will leave us two subsamples of similar length. 
                                                          
16
 Andalusia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and Valencian Community.  
17
 Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile and Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura Comunidad 
de Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja.  
17 
 
The evolution of fiscal autonomy across time in both subsamples is quite stable in both groups of 
regions
18
 although with a remarkable gap between regions with low and high level of competencies.  
 
The use of two alternative criteria to divide the sample will let us overcome some of the shortcomings 
which are attached to each criterion. On the one hand, splitting the sample according to the role 
recognized in the Constitution may arise the doubt that we may be accounting for a systematic 
difference between both groups of regions that may not come from the level of fiscal autonomy but 
from an ignored source
19
. On the other hand, breaking the sample into two time-periods may be 
interpreted as the identification of some structural change across time. 
     
Primary estimations of equation (1) suggest the presence of autocorrelated errors. Therefore, the 
original model in equation has been estimated in the presence of serially correlated errors
20
.  Initially, 
we also assume strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables ( , ,[ , ] 0i s i tE x   ;  t,s=1,2,...T). This 
assumption may be considered too strong for our model. Many results
21
 show that the allocation of 
public expenditure may be endogenous to the allocation of grants. The distribution of the Structural 
Funds may be thought to respond to some unobserved necessities and conjuncture that simultaneously 
drives decisions on public investment. We must admit the possibility that some of the explanatory 
variables, in particular eusf, must be correlated to the error term since the propensity to increase public 
investment may incentive larger allocation of Structural Funds (thus, making causality run in the 
opposite direction to the one assumed in the paper).  
     
The immediate solution to the problem could be to find some instrumental variables correlated to 
structural funds but orthogonal to public investment. Alternatively, we can use lags of the dependent 
and explanatory variables as instruments. The GMM estimation method developed by Arellano and 
                                                          
18
 See González-Alegre (2008) 
19
 Despite the fact that there are no remarkable differences in the level of economic development among both 
groups of regions. Neither there are geographical, commercial or cultural differences among them.  
20
 Preliminary estimations suggest also the use of fixed-effects models. The results of the random effects 
estimations, as well as the Hausman test are omitted for the sake of brevity. 
21
 Knight, 2002; Becker, 1996; Besley and Case, 2000. 
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Bond (1991) relies on the orthogonality of the dependent and explanatory variables with the first 
differences of the error component in lagged periods. This method allows us to include endogenous 
and predetermined dependent variables. These GMM methods construct moment conditions that reflect 
this orthogonality, under assumption of serially uncorrelated shocks, error components and 
predetermined initial conditions
22
. The problem would be, therefore, that we have previously admitted 
the possibility of the existence or AR(1) errors in the original model, which implies that lagged values 
of the dependent and explanatory variables are correlated with past shocks and the moment conditions 
that should be used
23
, are no longer valid in the original model 
     
For that reason, we transform the static model into a dynamic one with serially uncorrelated shocks by 
subtracting the autocorrelation term attached to the original errors: 
     
i,t i,t i,t ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x   + i i t       where , , ,1i t i t i te e u    
 
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t ,PubInv  = *PubInv +  eusf  -  eusf +  x  -  x  +(1- ) i i tu           (2) 
     
Equation (2) represents a model with serially uncorrelated shocks that we can estimate using Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM estimator for dynamic panels. The explanatory variables are correlated with 
the individual effects and are assumed to be endogenous with respect to the serially uncorrelated 
shocks.  
 
Estimation Results. Table 3 shows the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) when we divide our 
sample according to the level of autonomy recognized for the regions in the Spanish Constitution. 
Columns [1] to [4] include the estimation for the regions with a lower level of autonomy while 
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 , ,[ ] [ ] [ ] 0i i t i i tE E E       ; , ,[ ] 0i s i tE    for t s  and , 1 ,[ ] 0i i tE PubInv    t=2,...T 
respectively. 
23
 , ,[ ] 0i t s i tE PubInv     for t=3,…T and 2s  ; , ,[ ] 0i t s i tE x    , for t=3,…T and 2s  if variables 
in x are endogenous 
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columns [5] to [8] include the estimations for the remaining seven regions with a larger level of fiscal 
autonomy. Columns [1]-[2] and [5]-[8] assume a fixed-effects
24
 model with autocorrelated errors, 
while [3]-[4] and [7]-[8] are estimates for equation (2) obtaining assuming engogeneity of explanatory 
variables using one-step version of the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In 
addition, we assume two sets of control variables, one more general and one more restrained.  
 
Results are quite homogeneous among models for every set of regions. The Structural Actions (eusf) 
seem to be a significant determinant of Public Investment in the regions with low level of 
competencies, being the coefficient estimated significantly positive 0 and smaller than one. However, 
for the regions with a high level of competencies, the coefficients estimated are smaller and generally 
insignificantly different from zero.  
 
As for the remaining control variables, the main source of variability between both data-sets in the 
coefficient attached to Public Consumption that show a behaviour quite similar to the one described for 
eusf. Public consumption will capture the effects of the size of the regional administration. It is 
expected to increase with larger fiscal autonomy and, therefore, induce further increases also in Public 
Investment. Private investment is a positive determinant of Public Investment in all cases while the 
remaining control variables do not seem to play a key role.  
 
Having estimated a different effect of the Structural Actions on Public Investment for the two groups 
of regions, we also make a second estimation by splitting the sample through the time dimension. If we 
examine Figure [3], we can see how the level of fiscal autonomy of both groups of regions has 
increased over time. By splitting the sample around year 2000, the level of fiscal autonomy remains 
relatively stable for both groups of regions across time
25
, keeping a significant difference among them. 
The results of the equivalent estimations are shown in Table [4]. We have estimated an impact of the 
                                                          
24
 The selection of the fixed-effects model has been made upon estimation of the equivalent random-effects 
model and the corresponding Hausman (1979) test. Acordingly, the autocorrelated errors have been included 
upon estimation of preliminary models.  
25
 See González-Alegre (2010) 
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EUSF on Public Investment larger and significantly positive for the period 1993-1999, while the 
estimates for the period 2000-2007 show poor levels of significance. Regarding Public Consumptions, 
the differences observed in the previous estimation remain but are less strong. The behavior of the 
other control variables remains stable.  
 
Interaction Term 
 
In order to take into account for the effect of the evolution Fiscal Decentralization on the relationship 
between the Structural Actions and Public investment, we will make use of an Interaction term. 
Interaction terms may be added to a model in order to incorporate the joint effect of two variables on a 
dependent variable, over and above their separate effects. These are usually added as the cross-product 
of two independent variables, typically placing them after the simple "main effects".  
  
In this subchapter, we will analyze the interaction of fiscal decentralization (represented by the 
variable “dec”) and the capital transfers received by regional governments (represented by “eusf”). The 
separate effect of both variables are expected to be positive, since an increase in the level of fiscal 
decentralization (measured as the ratio of per capita regional over national public expenditures) is 
assumed to increase the size of regional governments and, therefore, increase on public expenditures –
compressive of public investment-. The effect of the capital transfers through the Structural Actions 
(eusf) would follow the arguments examined in the previous subchapter.  
 
i,t (1) i,t (2) (3) i,t ,PubInv  =  eusf  + dec+ eusf*dec+  x   + i i t       (3) 
 
The interaction term would capture, therefore, the joint effect of these two variables. We can see in 
table 5 the results of estimating the model represented by equation (3) for the whole sample. We have 
expanded our set of alternative control variables, since we expected that the correlation between 
“Public Consumption” and “dec” might be problematic. The results, however, look quite robust with 
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respect to this issue. As for the estimation assumptions and methodology, we have followed similar 
guidelines as tables 3-4. 
 
We have estimated a negative coefficient attached to the interaction term in all cases. The level of 
significance, however, is variable and seems to depend on the set of controls. The negative coefficient 
means that the join effect of additional decentralization and public investment becomes weaker. If we 
assume a fixed level of decentralization, for example, additional EUSF will induce an effect on Public 
investment equal to the coefficient estimated for EUSF plus the coefficient estimated for the 
interaction term multiplied by the value of decentralization. Given that the coefficient estimated for the 
interaction term is negative, the effect of EUSF on public investment is positive, but decreasing for 
larger decentralization. 
 
Cross-product interaction terms may be highly correlated with the corresponding simple independent 
variables in the regression equation, creating problems with assessing the relative importance of main 
effects and interaction effects. Because of this, sometimes it may well be desirable to use centered 
variables (where one has subtracted the mean from each datum). This transformation often reduces 
multicollinearity. For the sake of robustness, we have also run equivalent estimation using a centered 
interaction term and the results do not change significantly (see table 6) 
 
Simultaneous Equation model  
 
We want to check the robustness of our result to the introduction of a simultaneous equation model 
(SEM), in which we capture causality in both directions. One could think that the two variables in 
which we focus our interest: eusf and public investment, are jointly determined by a system of 
equations. In fact, the political decision of investing is closely related to the political decision of 
allocating –or making use of- the Structural Funds. Also the economic realization of the payments is 
closely related, given that both variables are often related to common investment projects. In addition, 
each one of the variables may be a determinant of the other one. So far we have considered that the 
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allocation of Structural Funds may encourage Public Investment, but me must be aware that the 
propensity to invest in the public sector may also incentive the allocation of Structural Funds in a 
particular region.  
 
The system consists of two structural equations, one in which the dependent variable is Public 
Investment, while in the other the capital transfers allocated through the Structural Funds. Each of the 
equations includes one of the variables as dependent variable but also the other one as an explanatory –
endogenous- variable. In addition to these, we also include a set of exogenous variables
26
:  
 
i,t (1) i,t (1) (1)i,t (1) (1) ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x   + i i t     (4) 
i,t (2) i,t (2) (2)i,t (2) (2) ,eusf  = PubInv   +  x   + i i t     (5) 
 
Where (1) x and (2) x  are two vectors, (1xm) and (1xn) respectively, of exogenous explanatory 
variables. Both vectors are not identical, but they can share some variables. (1)   and (2)   are the set 
of parameters, (mx1) and (nx1) respectively, associated to the exogenous variables that must be 
estimated. (1)i  and (2)i are the unobservable unit-specific effects and (1) ,i t and (2) ,i t  are the 
unobservable error terms. 
 
We estimate the model above following different alternative estimation methods in order to check for 
the robustness of the results
27
. First of all, we assume that the source of endogeneity is present through 
a positive correlation between the endogenous variables and the error term (1) ,i t . In this setup, the 
model may be estimates assuming Fixed-Effects through two-stage least-squares (FE-2SLS) and 
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 One might be tempted to think that Public Current Expenditures should take part of the simultaneous equations 
model as an endogenous variable. As Wooldridge (2002) describes for an example relating hours devoted to 
crime with hours devoted to work, the choice of the share of the public budget devoted to current expenditures 
and to investment is the solution of the maximization problem of the utility function of the government and 
depends on exogenous factors –like the population, level of education, private investment, etc-. Of course, some 
endogeneity may arise when estimating the relations among both variables, but we consider that this possibility is 
more related to an omitted variables problem –or even to measurement error- rather than to simultaneity. The 
case for Public Investment and Capital Transfers (EUSF) is different since in this case both expenses are accrued 
simultaneously when referred to the same investment project. 
27
 We use limited information estimators, which means that every equation of the system is estimated at a time, in 
contrast to full-information systems, in which the estimators are based on the entire systems of equations. 
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assuming Random-Effects through the Error-Component two-stage least-squares estimator developed 
by Baltagi (1981)
28
. Results obtained using this estimation strategy are presented in table 8. 
 
Alternatively, we may assume that the source of endogeneity comes from the positive correlation 
between the idiosyncratic term and the endogenous variables. The explanatory variables are, then, 
orthogonal to the structural errors and the exogenous variables are, in addition, orthogonal to the 
idiosyncratic term,  . If we assume  Fixed-Effects, the model can be estimated by OLS after the 
within transformation, as shown by Cornwell et al. (1992). For the cases in which the unit-specific 
effects are random, we make use of the Two-stage least-square Hausman and Taylor (1981) procedure 
(HT-2SLS) estimator
29
. The method of 2SLS is the most common method used for estimating 
simultaneous-equations models, because of their simplicity and asymptotic efficiency. In this case, we 
include also additional variables on equations (6) and (7), (1) z and (2) z  respectively, which are two 
vectors of time-invariant explanatories, including both endogenous and exogenous variables: 
 
    i,t (1) i,t (1) (1)i,t (1) (1)i (1) (1) ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x  + z  + i i t          (6) 
      
i,t (2) i,t (2) (2)i,t (2) (2)i (2) (2) ,eusf  = PubInv   +  x  + z  + i i t      (7) 
 
Usually, as we are not interested in their effect, time-invariant variables are omitted since their effect 
may be captured by the idiosyncratic-term. However, for the HT 2SLS estimator, they are used as 
instruments to estimate the system, so it may be useful to include them. We describe in table 7 the time 
invariant variables included in the HT 2SLS regression. These are, basically, determinants of the 
Investment needs and economic performance at the beginning of the sample and its selection has been 
made upon consultation of several studies addressing public investment
30
. Results upon the assumption 
that the endogenous variables are correlated with the unit-specific term are shown in table 9. 
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 See Baltagi (2005) for details on this estimator.  
29
 There are alternative procedures to the HT, for example the Amemiya and Mc Curdi (1986) or the Breusch et 
al. (1989), which make use of additional instruments but at the cost of additional assumptions about the 
exogeneity of the explanatory variables and all their future and past values. See Cornwell et al. (1992) for a 
detailed description of the different estimators and their properties.  
30
 With a particular attention to Mitze (2007), since he uses also this simultaneous equation estimator 
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Both, tables 8 and 9, show similar results with respect to most of the variables under consideration. 
The results previously observed with respect to the impact of the Structural Funds on Public 
investment are reinforced in after this estimation, although it must be stressed that the option in which 
we assume fixed-effect and orthogonality of the endogenous variables with the error term (table 9) 
yields poor significant coefficients. Public Investment, simultaneously, seems to be a key determinant 
of the volume of Structural Funds allocated to each region in each period, although the coefficients 
attached to this direction of the causality are significantly smaller than those from equation (4) and (6).  
 
Decentralization is a positive determinant of public investment. This result was know from the 
previous estimations of the paper and it was also expected, since the variable fiscal decentralization is 
an indicator of the size of the regional government
31
 and, therefore, of its expenditure power. 
Nevertheless, we find a significant negative coefficient when estimating the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on the Structural funds (equations (5) and (7)). At a first glance, one might be tempted 
to think that after increasing the level of fiscal autonomy of a region, Public investment may be spread 
over more heterogeneous policy areas. This expansion may be attached to competencies that are not 
eligible for the Structural Funds, reducing, therefore, the possibility of the government to maintain the 
relationship between Structural Funds and public investment.  
 
The coefficient estimated for the exogenous variables are, in general, expected and consistent across 
models. Among them, the level of significance of “population growth” as a negative determinant of 
public investment becomes relevant with respect to previous subchapters of this paper.  
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 As well as the variable “Public Consumption. In fact, one might expect a significant level of colinearity 
between both variables, which would justify the use of the alternative models estimated, as introduced before.  
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Tables 10 and 11 replicate the SEM estimation after splitting the sample into the group of regions with 
low level of competencies and the regions with high level of competencies. Table 10 presents the results 
assuming that the source of the endogeneity is the correlation of the variables with the unit-specific 
effect, while table 11 assumes correlation with the error term. We have estimated only the reduced 
versions of the models assuming both, random and fixed-effects. The estimations have to be taken 
cautiously since the number of observations is a bit limited. In general, the coefficients estimated for 
the regions with low level of autonomy are larger in absolute value and level of significance for the 
variables of our interest which is in line with our previous results. Public investment, as a determinant 
of EUSF is stronger also in the regions with low level of autonomy, while in the regions with high 
level of autonomy, EUSF seem to depend very few of the propensity of the government to invest. 
Finally, also the level of fiscal decentralization as a determinant of EUSF seems to be more –
negatively- important in regions with low level of autonomy. That is somehow an expected result since 
these regions have experienced the larger decentralization process and, in any case, confirms our 
previous suspicious that by gaining fiscal autonomy regions find it more difficult to be eligible for 
additional grants.    
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The impact and efficiency of the Structural Actions carried over by the European Union in order to 
enhance sustainable development in European Regions may depend of the level of fiscal federalism of 
the Member States. In this paper, we address the particular case of the Structural Actions designed to 
enhance Public Investment in key areas for growth.  
 
Spain has experienced a process of fiscal decentralization in the recent years and, simultaneously, has 
been recipient of an important share of the Structural Actions. Due to the heterogeneous level of 
economic development and also to the diverse political status of Spanish regions, both policies have 
affected these regions in an asymmetric way. These conditions make Spanish regions the perfect 
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benchmark in order to analyze the role of fiscal decentralization on the mechanisms driving the 
Structural Actions.  
 
We test whether the impact of the European Union Structural Funds (EUSF) on Public Investment at 
the regional level is affected by the level of fiscal autonomy of the recipient government. For this 
purpose, we build and estimate a panel data model in which Public Investment is the dependent 
variable and the EUSF is among the set of explanatory variables. We use Spanish data at the regional 
level for the period 1993-2007. 
 
In order to capture the role of fiscal decentralization, our first exercise is to break the sample into sub-
groups with similar levels of fiscal decentralization among them. By comparing the different estimates 
we are able to identify whether the level of fiscal autonomy determines the impact of the EUSF on 
Public Investment. The coefficients estimated for EUSF in the sub-groups with lower level of fiscal 
autonomy were larger and with stronger levels of significance. The effectiveness of these 
intergovernmental grants might be negatively affected by the level of fiscal autonomy of the granted 
government. 
 
Secondly, we construct a model that we estimate for the entire sample, in which we introduce a 
measure of Fiscal Decentralization (DEC) as well as an interaction term of both variables (DEC and 
EUSF) among the set of explanatory variables. The purpose is that the interaction term captures the 
join effect of both variables in Public Investment. We estimate a negative coefficient attached to the 
interaction term, this meaning that the effect of one of the variables on the Public Investment depends, 
negatively, on the value of the other.  
 
Finally, we construct a simultaneous equation model in which Public Investment and EUSF are 
decided simultaneously and each one is a determinant of the other. We conclude that, although to a 
minor extend, the decision of the regional government of investing may also determine the amount of 
EUSF allocated to it on that year. We also estimate that DEC is a negative determinant of EUSF, 
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meaning that regions with larger fiscal autonomy –being equal the level of public investment- will 
receive less Funds. This situation may be induced by the larger dispersion of the policy areas in which 
these regions decide their investment. Many of these “new” policy areas may be not eligible for the 
Funds. Of course, there may be other interpretations of this negative coefficient estimated, but always 
under the premise that regions with larger level of fiscal autonomy find less incentives to increase their 
investment through the Structural Actions. 
 
These results are not surprising, if we make use of a simple theoretical model constructed from the few 
theoretical studies that link fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental grants. According to our 
model, fiscal decentralization makes intergovernmental grants more effective as long as 
decentralization is related to larger fiscal autonomy to decide on the expenditure side of the budget or 
to lower importance of inter-regional redistribution of income. However, when fiscal decentralization 
is based on larger autonomy over taxation, intergovernmental grants become less effective. This is 
precisely the case of Spanish regions. In the period under consideration, inter-regional redistribution of 
income has remained relatively stable, while most of the gains of fiscal autonomy have been related to 
larger leeway to decide on taxation policies. 
 
The results in this paper support the argument that the optimal design of the Structural Actions should 
internalize the extremely heterogeneous levels of fiscal federalism that we observe across Member 
States. In particular, after the recent enlargements of the European Union, we observe a great degree of 
heterogeneity in the design of the regional sector across countries, with extremely different levels of 
fiscal federalism and allocation of competencies across levels of the public administration. The 
Structural Actions are not able to respond to this heterogeneity only under the condition that they may 
be allocated either to national or sub-national levels of administration. However, the rules governing 
the Funds are equal in all cases, and we can show that, at least with respect to the level of efficiency of 
the Funds, the fiscal autonomy of the recipient government makes a difference.  
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Appendix. 
 
Table A1. Fiscal Decentralization and European Cohesion Policy: Previous Empirical Studies 
with Spanish regional data.  
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Autor/s 
(year) 
Main Issue Data 
coverage 
Methodology Main Results 
Alvárez  et 
al. (2000) 
The impact of fiscal 
decentralization on 
the size of the 
public sector 
Spanish 
public 
sector at the 
regional 
level, 1993 
Estimation of a 
model for cross-
sectional data 
Fiscal decentralization has a negative 
impact on the size of the public 
sector 
Molero 
(2002) 
Public Spending 
and Fiscal 
Federalism in 
Spain 
Spanish 
Public 
Administrat
ions, 1988 
1998 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Fiscal decentralization is more 
related to Public Expenditure related 
to economic intervention in regions 
with low level of competencies, 
while in regions with a high level of 
competencies is more related to 
Redistribution. 
De la 
Fuente 
(2002) 
Impact of EU 
Cohesion Policy on 
Spanish Objective 1 
Regions 
Spanish 
Region-
level data, 
1994-2006 
Panel-data 
estimation of 
growth model, 
and calibration of 
the impact. 
The EU Funds add one percentage 
point to annual output growth in and 
0.4 percentage points to employment 
growth. 
Pardo 
Garcia 
(2003) 
European 
Cohesion Policy in 
Spanish Regions 
Spanish 
Regions, 
1988-1999 
Descriptive 
analysis of the 
Community 
Support 
Framework 
The weakest regions have improved 
their infrastructures, but there are 
many differences about their 
innovation capacity, knowledge 
access, information, and the training 
of human resources. 
 
Farrell 
(2004) 
Effect of European 
Cohesion Policy on 
Spanish and Irish 
Economies. 
National-
level data, 
1990-2000 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
EUSF promoted economic growth, 
but more efficiently in Ireland. In 
Spain, regional disparities actually 
increased. Part of the explanation lies 
with the institutional differences and 
policy decisions taken in each Public 
Administration. 
Sosvilla 
Rivero 
(2005) 
Impact of EUSF on 
growth and 
employment 
Spanish 
Objective 1 
Regions 
(1989 
2006) 
Adaptation of the 
HERMIN model 
to the Spanish 
regions (demand 
and supply 
effects of the 
EUSF). 
Average increase of 0.56 percentage 
points in the growth rates . Average 
increase in per capita income of 425 
euros at 1999 prices. Increase of 1.46 
per cent in employment. 
 
Perez 
González 
and 
Cantarero 
Prieto 
(2006) 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
and Economic 
Growth 
Spanish 
Regional 
Data, 
(1986-
2001) 
Panel data model. 
Fixed-Effects and 
Instrumental 
Variables. 
 
The impact of fiscal decentralization 
on economic growth is insignificant. 
Gil-Serrate 
and López-
Laborda 
(2005) 
Tax-
decentralization 
and economic 
growth 
Spanish 
national 
and 
regional 
data, 1980-
1997 
Calibration of 
growth model 
that accounts for 
tax 
decentralization 
An increase in the level of tax 
decentralisation in the Spanish 
economy compared to the level 
existing in the 
taken period would result in 
economic growth. 
 
Carrion-i- Contribution of Spanish Panel Data model For the regions with higher level of 
34 
 
Silvestre, 
Espasa and 
Mora 
(2008) 
fiscal 
decentralization to 
economic growth 
Regional 
Data, 1964-
2000 
estimated by 
GMM 
competencies, fiscal decentralization 
has positive and significant effects 
on economic growth, but fiscal 
decentralization has negative effects 
on the regions with lower level of 
competencies. 
González-
Alegre 
(2012) 
Effectiveness of EU 
Structural Actions; 
1993-2005 
EU15 and 
Spanish 
regional 
data 
Panel Data model 
estimated by 
GMM 
Public investment in the member 
countries makes up around 60% of 
the increase in EU funds. 
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FIGURE 1: Shares of Public Expenditure by level of administration 
     
 
        Source: Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics 
 
FIGURE 2: Ratio of state and local public expenditure to general government expenditure. 1995 
2007.  
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Source: Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics. 
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FIGURE 3: Decentralization Ratio. Ratio of per capita public expenditure of the regional 
government to the per capita public expenditure of the central government (excluding social 
security).  
 
 
Source: Badespe and “Liquidación del presupuesto de las CC AA” 
 
FIGURE 4: Sources of Revenues as percentage of GDP 
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FIGURE 5: Capital transfers from the EU to the Spanish regional governments. (% GDP and 
Euro per capita) 
 
  
    Source: “Liquidación del presupuesto de las CCAA” 
 
FIGURE 6: Ratio Capital to Total Expenditure 
 
 
Source: “Liquidación del presupuesto de las CCAA” 
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1: Variables and sources of data 
 
Variable Label Definition Units Source 
Public Investment PubInv 
Gross fixed capital formation in the 
Regional Government  
%GDP 
Badespe database 
(Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales, 
Ministry of 
Economy) 
EU Structural 
Funds 
EUSF 
EU expenditure executed corresponding 
to Structural funds, by Member State. 
%GDP 
Liquidación de 
Presupuestos de 
las CC AA, 
Ministry of 
Economy 
Public 
Consumption 
PCons 
Public Current expenditure in the 
Regional Government  
 
%GDP Badespe database 
Private Investment PrivInv 
Investment of tangible and intangible 
assets  in the private sector 
 
%GDP 
IVIE (Valencian 
Institute of 
Economic 
Research) 
Central 
Government 
Investmeng 
CGInv 
Public investment from the central 
government disaggregated at the regional 
level 
%GDP 
1984-1999 IVIE 
2000-2007 PGE 
(General Public 
Budget) 
GDP growth GDPgr Real GDP growth 
Growt
h rate 
INE (National 
Statistical Office) 
Population growth Popgr  Population in miles persons  
Growt
h rate 
Eurostat 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
DEC 
Ratio of per capital public expenditure of 
the regional government to per capital 
public expenditure of the central 
government  
Ratio 
Badespe database 
(Eurostat for 
population) 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PubInv 255 0.0285 0.012 0.0054 0.0586 
EUSF 255 0.0054 0.005 0.0000 0.0307 
PCons 255 0.1011 0.048 0.0144 0.2213 
PrivInv 255 0.2335 0.043 0.1404 0.3702 
CGInvest 255 0.0180 0.010 0.0017 0.0681 
GDPgr 255 0.0735 0.027 0.0152 0.2088 
POPgr 255 0.0083 0.010 -0.0046 0.0383 
DEC 255 0.5700 0.295 0.1055 1.6255 
DEC*EUSF 255 0.0030 0.003 0.0000 0.0164 
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TABLE 3: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Regions with different levels of Autonomy 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Regions with low level of competencies (art. 151) Regions with high level of competencies (art.143) 
         
 F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)   0.5081*** 0.4679***   0.6888*** 0.7257*** 
   0.080 0.077   0.080 0.071 
eusf 0.5913*** 0.5981*** 0.6366*** 0.5858*** 0.0176 0.0092 0.3573* 0.2690 
 0.143 0.142 0.156 0.152 0.184 0.178 0.217 0.219 
PubCons 0.0647*** 0.0526** 0.0732** 0.0693*** 0.0451 0.0533 0.1075 0.1102* 
 0.023 0.021 0.028 0.027 0.054 0.048 0.071 0.061 
PrivInv 0.0820*** 0.0782*** 0.0847*** 0.0815*** 0.0656*** 0.0624*** 0.0611*** 0.0623*** 
 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.019 0.018 0.022 0.022 
CGInvest -0.0322  0.0280  -0.1112  -0.0215  
 0.066  0.074  0.124  0.131  
GDPgr -0.0131  -0.0270*  -0.0031  -0.0121  
 0.012  0.016  0.009  0.013  
POPgr -0.1418  -0.1138  0.0235  0.0285  
 0.120  0.140  0.113  0.112  
F test group  4.33 (.001) 7.26 (.000)   6.15 (.000) 6.78   (.000)   
R2 within 0.321 0.3092   0.152 0.1502   
Autocorr. Test D-W = .7933 D-W = .7951 
AB(1) -2.67 
(.00) AB(1) -2.65 (.00) D-W  = .6732 D-W = .5007 
AB(1) -1.97 
(.04) AB(1) -1.96 (.04) 
B-W = .9651 B-W = .9639 AB(2) 1.18 (.23) AB(2) 1.38 (.16) B-W= 1.0279 B-W= .8483 AB(2) 0.76 (.44)  AB(2) 0.17 (.86)  
Sargan test   94.743 97.339   75.742 78.676 
stat   0.77 0.75   0.35 0.39 
Obs (groups) 140 (10) 140 (10) 130 (10) 130 (10) 98 (7) 98 (7) 91 (7) 91 (7) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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TABLE 4: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Time-Evolution 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 1993-1999 2000-2007 
         
 F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)   0.4551*** 0.3934***   0.1643 0.0831955 
   0.108 0.096   0.115 0.107 
eusf 0.5886*** 0.5884*** 0.7426*** 0.4373** 0.0851 0.1854 0.0316 0.0562522 
 0.165 0.161 0.237 0.222 0.220 0.215 0.236 0.244 
PubCons 0.0929* 0.1021** 0.0907 0.1182* 0.0232 0.0338 0.1027** 0.0947564 
 0.047 0.044 0.068 0.069 0.035 0.034 0.047 0.037 
PrivInv 0.0669** 0.0705*** 0.0467 0.0628* 0.0623** 0.0619** 0.1199*** 0.1281358 
 0.028 0.025 0.037 0.032 0.024 0.024 0.041 0.037 
CGInvest -0.0148  0.1040  -0.1555*  -0.00038  
 0.130  0.180  0.081  0.123  
GDPgr -0.0072  -0.0349***  -0.0051  0.0166  
 0.008  0.013  0.040  0.048  
POPgr 0.0167  -0.4982  -0.1063  -0.1841  
 0.252  0.463  0.120  0.176  
F test group  3.52  (.000) 3.73   (.000)   9.79 (.000) 14.21 (.000)   
R2 within 0.3059 0.2973   0.142 0.0997   
Autocorr. Test 
D-W = .9509 D-W = .8448 AB(1)-2.26 (.02) AB(1)-2.04 (.04) D-W = 1.227 D-W = 1.175 
AB(1)-2.20 
(.02) AB(1)-2.38 (.01) 
B-W = 1.350 B-W = 1.264 
AB(2) -.065 
(.94) AB(2) -.491 (.62) B-W = 1.553 B-W = 1.491 AB(2) .566 (.57) AB(2) .851 (.39)  
Sargan test   27.128 31.83   61.767 64.890 
stat   0.98 0.74   -0.48 0.16 
Obs (groups) 102 (17) 102 (17) 85 (17) 85 (17) 119 (17) 119 (17) 102 (17) 102 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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TABLE 5: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Interaction Term 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 F-E F-E F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)     0.5881*** 0.5807*** 0.5366*** 0.5400*** 
     0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
eusf 0.6482*** 0.6895*** 0.6477*** 0.6757*** 0.7860*** 0.7898*** 0.5452** 0.5262** 
 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.21 
dec 0.0189** 0.0173*** 0.0164*** 0.0154*** 0.0222*** 0.0208*** 0.0169*** 0.0167*** 
 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dec*eusf -0.5612* -0.6267* -0.5269 -0.5732* -0.7154* -0.7325** -0.5390 -0.4977 
 0.338 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.35 
PrivInv 0.0462*** 0.0475*** 0.0444*** 0.0456*** 0.0492*** 0.0508*** 0.0594***  
 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
PubCons -0.0198  -0.0134  -0.0169  0.00073 0.0608*** 
 0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 0.02 
CGInvest -0.0177 -0.0203   0.0432 0.0427   
 0.05 0.05   0.06 0.06   
GDPgr -0.0129* -0.0119*   -0.0263*** -0.0247***   
 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   
POPgr -0.1606* -0.1629**   -0.1253 -0.1273   
 0.08 0.08   0.09 0.09   
F test group  5.93 (.000) 5.76 (.000)  7.80 (.000)  7.54 (.000)     
R2 within 0.3014 0.297 0.2743 0.2699     
AR Test D-W = .654 D-W = .618 D-W = .652 D-W = .612 
AB(1) -3.13 
(.00) 
AB(1)-3.10 
(.00) 
AB(1)-3.05 
(.00) 
AB(1)-3.02 
(.00) 
B-W = .896 B-W = .860 B-W = .902 B-W = .866 AB(2) .858 (.39)  AB(2) .891 (.37) AB(2) .526 (.59) AB(2) .519 (.60) 
Sargan test     173.888 174.296 168.892 169.070 
stat     0.63 0.65 0.71 0.67 
Obs (groups) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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TABLE 6: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Centered Interaction Term 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 F-E F-E F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)     0.5796*** 0.5775*** 0.5401*** 0.5424*** 
     0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
eusf 0.6482*** 0.6894*** 0.6477*** 0.6757*** 0.7500*** 0.7746*** 0.5433** 0.5446** 
 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 
dec 0.0189*** 0.0173*** 0.0164*** 0.0154*** 0.0218*** 0.0208*** 0.0169*** 0.0172*** 
 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
dec*eusf -0.5612* -0.6266* -0.5269 -0.5731* -0.6856* -0.7210** -0.5279 -0.5359 
 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.35 
PrivInv 0.0462*** 0.0475*** 0.0444*** 0.0456*** 0.0484*** 0.0497*** 0.0556*** 0.0559*** 
 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
PubCons -0.0198  -0.0134  -0.0143  0.0018  
 0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  
CGInvest -0.0177 -0.0203   0.0426 0.0424   
 0.05 0.05   0.06 0.06   
GDPgr -0.0129* -0.0119*   -0.0246** -0.0239**   
 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   
POPgr -0.1605* -0.1629**   -0.1249 -0.1279   
 0.08 0.08   0.09 0.09   
F test group 4.86 (.000) 4.63 (.000) 6.06 (.000) 5.76 (.000)     
R2 within 0.30 0.297 0.2743 0.2699     
AR Test 
D-W = .654 D-W = .618 D-W = .652 D-W = .612 
AB(1) -3.11 
(0.00) 
AB(1) -3.10  
(.00) 
AB(1) -3.10  
(.00) 
AB(1) -3.04  
(.00) 
B-W = .896 B-W = .860 B-W = .902 B-W = .866 
AB(2) .846  
(.39) 
AB(2) .891  
(.37) 
AB(2) .876  
(.38) 
AB(2) .541  
(.58) 
Sargan test     173.921 174.45 171.060 170.784 
stat     0.63 0.64 0.67 0.64 
Obs (groups) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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TABLE 7: Time invariant variables. Definition and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition  Units Source 
Ob
s Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
         
initGDPpc 
GDP per 
capita in 1993 
Miles 
Euro 
INE 25
5 
9430.85 1688.62 6640.56 12389.48 
Pubcapst93 
Stock of 
public capital 
in 1993 
Miles 
Euro 
FBBVA
-Ivie 
25
5 
7235480 5458365 1268752 21600000 
Privcapst9
3 
Stock of 
private capital 
in 1993 
Miles 
Euro 
FBBVA
-Ivie 
25
5 
4290000
0 
3880000
0 
4980675 142000000 
PobAct93 
working aged 
population 
Miles 
peopl
e 
IVIE 
25
5 
1833.97 1547.83 210.55 5374.87 
educ93 
Average years 
of schooling 
in working 
aged 
population 
years 
IVIE 
25
5 
7.4488 0.5597 6.5000 8.4800 
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TABLE 8: Regional Public Investment and EU Structural Funds. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogeous” error term 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 PubInv eusf 
 EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS 
eusf 1.4957*** 1.3570 1.4913*** 0.0176     
 0.481 0.987 0.335 0.815     
PubInv     0.2040*** 0.1104*** 0.1737*** 0.1042*** 
     0.027 0.032 0.028 0.032 
dec 0.0099** 0.0094** 0.0168*** 0.0157*** -0.0043*** -0.00074 -0.0032*** -0.00184** 
 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
PubCons 0.0481** 0.0494**   0.0035 -0.0105   
 0.020 0.022   0.008 0.008   
PrivInv 0.0353** 0.0341* 0.0276* 0.0130     
 0.016 0.019 0.015 0.017     
GDPgr -0.0237* -0.0225*       
 0.013 0.014       
POPgr -0.2170*** -0.2050** -0.2530*** -0.1906**     
 0.075 0.081 0.072 0.078     
CGInvest     -0.0053 -0.0479* -0.0194 -0.0486* 
     0.023 0.025 0.024 0.025 
RMSE 0.1712 0.1774 0.2208 0.2287 0.1981 0.2052 0.2277 0.2359 
         
Obs (groups) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
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TABLE 9: Regional Public Investment and EU Structural Funds. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogeous” individual effects 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 PubInv eusf 
 HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- 
eusf 0.5933*** 0.5648*** 0.5433*** 0.5313***     
 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.137     
PubInv     0.1055*** 0.1053*** 0.1002*** 0.1002*** 
     0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 
dec 0.00993*** 0.0099*** 0.0162*** 0.0160*** -0.000691 -0.00068 -0.00178** -0.0017** 
 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
PubCons 0.04267** 0.0425**   -0.0104 -0.0102   
 0.019 0.019   0.008 0.008   
PrivInv 0.02823* 0.0258* 0.0178** 0.0176     
 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015     
GDPgr -0.01847 -0.0181       
 0.012 0.012       
POPgr -0.1957*** -0.1847** -0.2108* -0.2058***     
 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.072     
CGInvest     -0.0476** -0.0483* -0.0489* -0.0489** 
     0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 
RMSE 0.1729 0.1769 0.2230 0.2282 0.2000 0.2047 0.2300 0.2353 
         
Obs (groups) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
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TABLE 10: Public Investment and EUSF. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogeous” error term. Regions by level of autonomy 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Regions with low level of competencies Regions with high level of competencies 
Dependent var. PubInv eusf PubInv eusf 
 EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS 
         
eusf 1.7222*** 3.1396**   0.8766 -2.399*   
 0.196 1.263   0.616 1.241   
PubInv   0.2801*** 0.2008***   0.0659* -0.0213 
   0.038 0.046   0.036 0.041 
dec 0.0164*** 0.0174*** -0.0052*** -0.0037*** 0.0102** 0.0074 -0.0027** -0.0014 
 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 
PrivInv 0.0541** 0.0791**   0.0102 -0.0021   
 0.022 0.034   0.023 0.026   
POPgr -0.2521*** -0.3949*   -0.2485** -0.3638***   
 0.080 0.206   0.115 0.134   
CGInvest   -0.0114 -0.0317   0.0331 -0.0438 
   0.030 0.031   0.048 0.049 
RMSE 0.2008 0.2081 0.2012 0.2084 0.2506 0.2598 0.2639 0.2736 
Obs (groups) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
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TABLE 11: Public Investment and EUSF. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogeous” individual effects. Regions by level of autonomy 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Regions with low level of competencies Regions with high level of competencies 
 HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- 
Dependent var. PubInv eusf PubInv eusf 
 HT FE HT FE HT FE HT FE 
eusf 0.7318*** 0.7328***   -0.4670* -0.4514   
 0.149 0.147   0.272 0.275   
PubInv   0.1820*** 0.1820***   -0.0381 -0.0381 
   0.044 0.043   0.037 0.037 
dec 0.0127*** 0.0127*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** 0.0083** 0.0071 -0.0014 -0.0014 
 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 
PrivInv 0.0628*** 0.0630***   0.0036 0.0072   
 0.020 0.019   0.019 0.021   
POPgr -0.1473 -0.1479   -0.2854*** -0.2675***   
 0.096 0.094   0.090 0.098   
CGInvest   -0.0345 -0.0345   -0.0412 -0.0412 
   0.031 0.031   0.048 0.049 
RMSE 0.2043 0.21021811 0.2047 0.2077 0.2571 0.2585 0.2707 0.2721 
Obs (groups) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
 
